![]() Ockham’s assumption of mental speech: Thinking in a world of particulars. For further details of Ockhams life, see Courtenay 1999. Shapiro (Eds.), Emotion and cognitive life in medieval and early modern philosophy. For an account of Ockhams life, including a discussion of how these dates are calculated in Ockhams case, see Wood 1997, Chap. Intellections and volitions in Ockham’s nominalism. Quaestiones in Librum IV Sententiarum (= Rep. Quaestiones in librum II Sententiarum (= Rep. Summa logicae (= SL), Opera Philosophica I (= OPh) (P. Voluntarism is the metaphysical and epistemological view that regards the will as superior to the intellect. ![]() Prologus et distinctio I, Opera Theologica I (= OTh) (G. Picking and choosing: Anselm and Ockham on choice. Versuche in der Theodicée über die Güte Gottes, die Freiheit des Menschen und den Ursprung des Übels (A. Earlier biographies generally put the date in 1285, but scholars now put it later. For further details of Ockham's life, see Courtenay 1999. He never became a Master of Theology, but he did teach at Oxford from 1317 to 1319, commenting there on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. For an account of Ockham's life, including a discussion of how these dates are calculated in Ockham's case, see Wood 1997, Chap. Spade (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Ockham (pp. William of Ockham, most famous for Ockham’s Razor, was an English Franciscan theological and philosophical author whose academic work was mostly done in England. William Ockham’s theory of the foundations of ethics. work of Ockham is argued for by Alfri (1989), Maurer (1999). Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume d’Ockham. William of Ockham accepted Scotus doctrine of intuitive cognition, but only. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.īaudry, Léon. Spade (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Ockham (pp. The challenge for Ockham, then, is to show how rational and moral action can be reconciled on this basis. As a result, it should become clear that this reading implies that Ockham basically splits up rational and moral action by allowing human agents to set up anything which exists as an end. My aim in this paper is to show that Ockham has the means to meet the objection of irrationality, at least if this is the objection that there can be free, yet ‘random’ choices of actions that are carried out for no reason, or for no end and thus, resist any attempt of explanation. This conception, however, gives rise to the worry that it implies the very possibility of acting irrationally, insofar as it implies the possibility of acting for no reason at all. 'William of Ockham on Right Reason,' Speculum 48 (1973): 13-36. Argues that Ockham's ethics falls between pure voluntarism and pure rationalism. An agent can be held morally responsible for his action only if he could have done other than he actually did. 'Voluntarism and Rationalism in the Ethics of Ockham,' Franciscan Studies 31 (1971): 72-87. Voluntarists such as Ockham commonly argue for the need of positing the possibility of opposite choices as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Freedom of will for Ockham consists in the possibility of opposite choices, as Panaccio puts it (Panaccio 2012, 75–93 and 91).
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |